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WHY DO SOME NASCENT AFRICAN MULTINATIONALS INVEST OUTSIDE THEIR 
HOME REGION? SHOULD THEY? 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study draws on preliminary case evidence to explore the motivations and advisability of nascent 
African MNEs’ engagement in outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) activities outside their 
home region. It complements recent research on MNEs from emerging markets, which has 
dominantly focused on the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) economies, with 
virtually no attention to potentially important players from rising Africa. The MNEs explored in this 
study originate from the energy, manufacturing, construction, chemicals, agribusiness, 
extractive/mining, and financial services sectors, and they have investment footprints in several 
economies of the Global ‘South’ and the advanced North. Their OFDI moves to both economic 
groupings seem to be commonly motivated by the search for market opportunities, strategic 
assets/resources and performance-boosting relationships, though more advanced economies appear to 
attract more strategic asset-seeking FDI from nascent African MNEs. The paper argues that 
intraregional investments by African MNEs should continue to attract primary attention, but 
selective and strategic extra-regional FDI, undertaken with an eye on further global competitiveness, 
also requires appropriate policy support. This seems even more sensible given that the prevalence 
and acceleration of borderless digital internationalisation and the increasingly blurred nationality of 
MNE affiliates are lessening the relevance of regional distinctions. 
 
KEY WORDS: FDI, Motivations, Multinational Enterprises, EMNEs, African MNEs, Southern, 
Advanced Economies 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Outward foreign direct investments (FDI) from the “South”, or by emerging market multinational 
enterprises (EMNEs), have witnessed such significant grown over the past few decades that they are 
now taken for granted. Latest UNCTAD statistics put FDI from developing economies at USD383 
billion, approximately a quarter of the total global flows of USD1.75 trillion (UNCTAD, 2017), 
buoyed by the significant flows from the BRICS, particularly China. The latter’s extensive footprint 
across Africa is well publicised, so is the considerable outlay of Developing Asian MNEs in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and the rising intraregional FDI flows within the transition economies, 
West Asia and Africa (UNCTAD, 2012). Increasingly also, the understandable quest for strategic 
assets, markets and other catch-up levers has pulled these EMNEs, including State-owned enterprises 
(SOE), into FDI, particularly mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in more advanced economies 
(Mathews, 2006; Kumar, 2009; Ramamurti and Singh, 2009; Birkinshaw et al., 2010; Madhok and 
Keyhani, 2012; Peng, 2012; Sarathy, 2013; Marchand, 2015; Rao-Nicholson et al., 2016).  
 
African MNEs are a part of these significant South-South and South-North FDI flows, albeit to a 
markedly lesser degree than the BRIC economies (BCG, 2010; Ibeh, 2013, 2015). Their input is 
reflected in the massive jump in the continent’s overall FDI stock, from USD38.9 billion in 2000 to 
USD268.7 billion in 2016, and its growing army of over 500 services multinationals (UNCTAD, 
2015). Notably also, intra-African FDI accounted for 76 per cent of the continent’s outflows on 
greenfield projects (UNCTAD, 2015), and cross-border intraregional M&A by nearly twenty fold, 
from USD130 million in 2013 to USD2.4 billion in 2014 (UNCTAD, 2015). Not surprisingly, South 
African MNEs are a dominant contributor to these African outward and intraregional FDI (Verhoef, 
2016), but nascent African MNEs notably from Nigeria, Togo, Morocco and Egypt are also 
increasingly prevalent.  
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African MNEs’ intraregional FDI activities, like those of their earlier Southern counterparts (Aykut 
and Battat, 2003), can be explained from an evolutionary, learning-by-doing, psychic or institutional 
proximity perspectives (Buckley et al., 2007; Ibeh, 2009). They can also be justified based on their 
probable contributions to job creation, knowledge transfer, infrastructure development, and to the 
emergence of more integrated African markets, particularly if these serve as viable learning 
platforms and enablers for African companies seeking to upgrade their capabilities and skill-sets to 
expand into more challenging advanced markets (Ibeh, 2009). The case for African MNEs’ South-
North FDI is, however, more contentious, particularly given concerns in the literature about 
integration failures and sub-optimal value-creation arising, inter alia, from absorptive capacity 
limitations and institutional dissimilarities (Rugman and Li, 2007; Peng, 2012; (Rao-Nicholson et al., 
2016). These are additional to more traditional questions, in scholarly and policy circles, about the 
net impact of OFDI on sustainable development indicators such as domestic employment (both intra-
firm and beyond), productivity, and knowledge base (technological and managerial), institutional 
upgrade and infrastructure development (Hejazi and Pauly, 2003; Hendriks, 2017).  
 
The aim of this present research is to explore the motivations and advisability of nascent African 
MNEs’ engagement in FDI activity outside their home region. It seeks to improve understanding of 
the nature of extra-regional OFDI activity being undertaken, the whys and wherefores for so doing, 
and the policy issues raised. The study contributes to the continuing scholarly and policy debate 
surrounding FDI destinations and EMNEs’ growth directions (Rugman and Li, 2007; Ibeh and 
Makhmadshoev, 2018). This paper further reflects on how relevant institutions, development 
partners and policy makers might better support current and potential African MNEs toward 
upgrading their capacity for investment decision making in order to better impact their home and 
regional economies. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section two presents a brief 
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and selective review of the literature pertaining to the issues raised and outlines relevant research 
questions. An explanation of the case study approach adopted is provided in section three. This is 
followed by the presentation, analysis and discussion of case material. The final section summarises 
the findings and discusses the public policy, economic development and future research implications. 
It should be noted that for the purposes of this study, direct investments by North African MNEs 
within the Middle East and North African (MENA) region are not considered extra-regional; this is 
given these MNEs’ connectedness to both Africa and the Middle East. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Theoretical explanations of the whys and wherefores for MNEs’ choice of FDI destinations have 
generally revolved around a phalanx of motives, including market-seeking (to access potentially 
lucrative foreign market opportunities); resource-seeking (to access potentially advantageous 
resources located abroad); efficiency-seeking (to exploit favorable cost structures, efficiencies or 
scale economies abroad); and strategic asset-seeking, including knowledge/technology- and 
relationship-seeking motivations (to access knowledge assets/capabilities and relational/network 
benefits embedded in market actors abroad) (Dunning, 1993; Mirza, 2000; Ibeh, Young, and Lin 
2004).  
 
The more traditional of these motives, market-, resource- and efficiency-seeking, can be traced to the 
asset exploitation logic of early international business economists (Hymer 1960; Caves, 1971) – 
echoed by the resource-based view (Penrose, 1959; Barney, 1991) -, which explains FDI as a means 
of optimizing quasi-monopolistic (and liability of foreignness-neutralizing) advantages possessed by 
MNEs over indigenous competitors. Such advantages, subsequently reframed as ownership, location 
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and internalisation advantages (OLI) (Dunning, 1977) or firm-specific assets (FSA) (Rugman, 1980), 
are thought to underpin MNEs’ search for market opportunities, resources and efficiencies via FDI. 
Later research, mainly on EMNEs, broadened these spectrum of advantages to encompass 
relationship and network advantages (Dunning, 1993), country-specific advantages, institutions 
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008) and government support (Kalotay and Sulstarova, 2008). Significantly, 
this later research stream posits asset exploitation and “O1” advantages as more relevant to 
explaining FDI by traditional MNEs than that of their emerging market counterparts. The latter, the 
argument goes, tend to be more focused on asset augmentation or seeking strategic assets, including 
knowledge, technology, intellectual property, brands, reputation or prestige, and critical 
relationships/networks (Mathews, 2002, 2006; Aulakh 2007; Luo and Tung, 2007; Amighini et al., 
2010; Chen et al., 2012; Gaffney et al., 2014), particularly as they move up the value chain into more 
complex and higher value-added activities. The Linkage-Leverage-Learning (LLL) framework 
postulated by Mathews (2002, 2006) aptly reflects this asset-augmentation perspective. 
 
The foregoing should not; be interpreted as implying that EMNEs only seek strategic assets in their 
FDI activities. On the contrary, classic FDI motivations, specifically the quest for markets, resources 
and efficiencies, are also relevant (Amighini et al., 2010; Yeganeh, 2016). The literature, to be sure, 
offers countless examples of market-seeking FDI among EMNEs, including Chinese firms’ push into 
Japan and Southeast Asia (Frost, 2004), Russian firms’ expansion into Eastern Europe (Vahtra and 
Liuhto, 2004) and South African MNEs’ expansion into other African markets (Klein and Wocke, 
2007; Vorheof, 2016). These EMNEs, even those with sizeable and rapidly growing domestic 
markets, are known to explore new foreign markets to enhance competitiveness against domestic 
rivals, get closer to customers and gain knowledge about foreign markets. Resource-seeking 
motivations, including search for raw materials and labour (De Beule and Duanmu, 2012), are also 
amply illustrated by Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Indian FDI to Africa, Latin America and 
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elsewhere (Casanova, 2004; Goldstein, 2006; Buckley et al., 2007). Although efficiency search tends 
to be of less importance to EMNEs - who typically enjoy lower cost-base via access to cheap labour, 
abundant natural resources, and government support -, rising competition in domestic and 
international markets appears to be changing this. There is evidence, for example, of EMNEs 
outsourcing to cut production cost (Sim and Pandian, 2007) or expanding to advanced countries in 
pursuit of scale economies (e.g. Tata Group’s acquisition of UK-Dutch steel group, Corus - 
Goldstein, 2008). Enhanced national prestige, or projecting corporate identity at the world stage, has 
also been identified as another important motivation among EMNEs, particularly those supported by 
their national governments (Gaffney et al., 2014). 
 
Regarding investment locations for developing economy MNEs, theory, specifically the 
evolutionary, learning-by-doing, demand similarity, psychic distance (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) 
and institutional proximity perspectives (Rugman and Li, 2007), essentially recommends priority 
attention to intraregional and other Southern economies given their better fit with the institutional 
characteristics and resource profiles of developing economy MNEs. Arita (2013), for example, 
attributed the higher presence of developing economy FDI in the Global South (e.g. Chinese and 
Indian MNEs in Africa - De Beule and Duanmu, 2012) to such broadly proximate institutional 
factors across developing markets. There is, however, some suggestion in the literature that FDI 
location decision is increasingly influenced by the motive/s underpinning the particular FDI activity. 
According to this literature strand, developing country MNEs with market-seeking motivations tend 
to gravitate toward more difficult institutional environments typically found in less developed 
countries, where their familiarity with poor institutional contexts and superior ability to understand 
and manage uncertain, volatile, and even harsh business conditions, and adapt to local market 
requirements may offer some advantage over their advanced economy counterparts (Cuervo-Cazurra 
and Genc, 2008; De Beule and Duanmu, 2012). On the other hand, those that seek strategic assets 
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appear to favour more advanced economies (Citigroup, 2005; UNCTAD, 2005; Goldstein, 2006; 
Amighini et al., 2010) – see for example, Pietrobelli et al. (2010) finding about China’s Haier 
acquisition of a well-known brand and manufacturing and R&D facilities in Italy. The corollary of 
the foregoing is that in their germane search for both catch-up strategic assets and market 
opportunities, some developing country MNEs are concurrently and ambidextrously investing in 
advanced and developing economies (Yeganeh, 2016). 
 
Previous research on the impact of outward internationalisation, including outsourcing and FDI, 
suggests a mixture of effects on home economies: direct positive (e.g. overseas profits and associated 
tax income);  direct negative (e.g. potential loss of jobs and reduced tax income); and indirect 
positive (e.g. cost savings resulting from optimal allocative efficiency or the so-called “batting 
average” effect associated with a lower cost location (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998; Bitzer and Gorg, 
2005). Outward FDI has been found to make a positive contribution to domestic total factor 
productivity, through spillover effects from accessing foreign R&D, capital stock, local knowledge, 
public infrastructure and leveraging agglomerative effects in target countries (Hejazi and Pauly, 
2003), and through technological and skill upgrading at home. Research also suggests that the impact 
of outward internationalisation may vary according to the type of industry or technological intensity 
(Bitzer and Gorg, 2005), the underlying motivation for the investment (Driffield and Love, 2007), 
the location of the investment (Bitzer and Gorg, 2005), and so on Evidence, for example, suggests 
that outward FDI in certain high technology sectors tends to lead to effective technology transfer and 
productivity gains at home. As noted earlier, such strategic asset-seeking FDI or ‘home-base 
augmenting’ FDI (Chung and Yeaple, 2004; Driffield and Love, 2007) are increasingly common, but 
their outcomes may depend on factors, including the location of the OFDI activity, the investing 
firm’s absorptive capacity, and the extent of institutional similarity/divergence between the investing 
firm and host economy.    
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The foregoing review raises the following questions, which are explored in the present study: 
 
What do we know about nascent African MNEs’ outward FDI activities outside their home region? 
Where are these activities located? 
 
Why are these extra-regional OFDI activities undertaken?  
 
How advisable is African MNEs’ engagement in extra-regional FDI?  
 
 
RESEARCH CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The foregoing research questions were addressed using a case study approach (Miles and Hubermann, 
1994; Yin, 2003), which is justified based on the severely limited extant knowledge on the FDI 
behaviour of African companies outside of the economically advanced South Africa. It also responds 
to repeated calls for more qualitative designs in international business research (Ghauri, 2004; 
Piekkari and Welch 2004; Welch and Piekkari, 2017), and has been successfully employed in 
studying emerging market MNEs from other regions (e.g. Sim and Panadian, 2003; Del Sol and 
Kogan, 2004). The following incremental steps were implemented to ensure good case research 
protocols and minimise associated weaknesses.  
 
First, the study context was delineated as rising Africa, which reflects the region’s recent sustained 
GDP growth (averaged 5 per cent during 2001-2014 and 3.6 per cent in 2015 - IMF, 2015), but also 
excludes South Africa, one of the BRICS economies with several well established global players 
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(Klein and Wocke, 2007; Verhoef, 2016). This delimitation also serves to draw attention to the 
significant level of outward FDI activity from the rest of the continent. The increased OFDI flows 
originate partly from a new generation of innovative and ambitious African champions (KPMG 
2013) and pan African groups, notably from Nigeria, Togo, and Morocco (IMF 2015). A recent 
report to the World Bank identifies nascent African MNEs as originating from Algeria, Angola, 
Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Togo and Uganda, and 
mainly from the financial services, extractive, construction and manufacturing sectors (Ibeh, 2013, 
2015). Kenyan investors are also noted as increasingly important in the East African sub-region 
(Ngugi, 2016). In addition to the increasingly observed intra-African FDI (UNCTAD, 2015), African 
OFDI is also directed further afield to other Southern economies and more advanced economies, 
mainly in Europe and North America (Ibeh, 2013, 2015). 
Second, drawing upon relevant best practice literature, the study population was defined as including 
MNEs that have undertaken FDIN and own or control value-adding activities in at least two 
countries outside Africa, and which operate under a system of decision-making that permits coherent 
policies and a common strategy (UNCTAD, 2011). Nine companies – not an exhaustive list - were 
selected for investigation, to ensure that the findings were not merely a result of one idiosyncratic 
setting (Miles and Hubermann, 1994).  
Third, secondary data from multiple sources, including electronic databases, national and 
supranational organisations, company websites and reports and business press, were examined for 
relevant insights on the case firms. Whilst the present study’s limited empirical base precludes any 
meaningful theory testing or generalizability, the case design allows for the exploration of theory 
(Yin, 2003) and generation of fresh insights on nascent African MNEs, via a triangulation of the 
aforementioned data sources. Extensive desk-based research enabled the development of case 
narratives, chronological timelines and longitudinal information on the study firms’ major FDI 
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activities, including corroboration of events. The above triangulation or integration of multiple 
sources produced a valuable and valid patchwork of evidence, in the best tradition of case study 
research (Yin, 2003). The foregoing aligns with earlier calls in the literature for a greater integration 
of secondary data sources in IB research (Mol and Birkinshaw, 2014; Puolis et. al. 2013), 
particularly as they “…provide empirical depth into a case-study project” (Puolis, et. al. 2013, p331).  
 
The data generated from the above outlined procedures was subjected to content analysis – a valid 
and widely employed method of developing an objective and systematic description of the manifest 
content of qualitative and archival data (Holsti, 1968; Aronoff, 1975; Bartunek, Bobko, and 
Venkatramen, 1993; Sydserff and Weetman, 2002). The particular form of content analysis adopted 
was the meaning-oriented analysis, which is more amenable to an issue-by-issue presentation 
approach, requires the researcher to focus on the underlying themes in the observed data, matching 
appropriate content with the pre-formulated research questions, and to interpret the findings 
accordingly (Sydserff and Weetman, 2002).  
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ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
Brief Profiles and Indicative FDI Footprints of the Focal MNEs  
 
The nascent African MNEs explored in the present study originate from Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, 
Nigeria, and Togo, and mainly from the energy, manufacturing, construction, chemicals, 
agribusiness, extractive/mining, and financial services sectors, These MNEs are the Elsewedy Group 
and Orascom Construction Industries (from Egypt); Office Chérifien des Phosphates (OCP, 
Morocco), Sonatrach Group (Algeria); Sonangol (Angola); and Attijariwafa Bank, and Groupe 
Banque Centrale Populaire (BCP, Morocco). The rest are the Ecobank Transnational Incorporated 
(Togo) and First Bank Holding (Nigeria). Each of these case subjects is now briefly profiled. 
 
Elsewedy Electric, founded in 1984, is an Egypt-based industrial conglomerate engaged in the 
manufacture and management of power cables, transformers, power generation units and other 
electrical products. It commenced outward international activities in 2000, has 30 factories in 14 
countries, exports to 110 countries, and generate most of its revenue internationally. The company 
has grown significantly both organically and through acquisitions and joint ventures in the Middle 
East, sub-Saharan Africa, Europe and other countries. See Table 1 for more profile information, 
including indicative FDI milestones and footprint.  
 
*Put Table 1 here* 
 
Orascom Construction Industries (OCI), founded and controlled by the Sawiris family, is one of 
Egypt’s largest corporations, employing 90,000 staff in 35 countries across Middle East and Africa, 
Europe, North America, and Asia. It specialises in large industrial construction and infrastructure and 
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fertilizer businesses and operates through major subsidiaries, including the OCI Construction Group, 
which provides international engineering and construction services for public and private clients, 
primarily on infrastructure, industrial and high-end commercial projects in the MENA region and 
Europe. The OCI Fertilizer Group [1] based in Netherlands ranks among the world’s top fertilizer 
producers and owns and operates nitrogen fertilizer plants in Egypt, Algeria, the Netherlands, US, 
and an international distribution platform spanning from the Americas to Asia. Latest available 
figures suggest annual revenues of USD5.5049bn, profit of USD719.8m and asset base of $9.83bn. 
OCI generates most of its revenue outside Egypt and this is likely to continue based on the Group’s 
intensifying international investments, including acquisitions and JVs. Table 2 offers more profile 
information on OCI, including sample FDI milestones and footprint.  
 
*Put Table 2 here* 
 
Group Office Chérifien des Phosphates (OCP), owned 94 per cent by the Moroccan government, is 
reputedly the world's leading exporter of phosphates and derivatives, with investments in several 
countries. It went public company in 2008, and employed 19,000 staff and generated USD7.49 
billion of revenue in 2011 - see Table 3). Among its international investments is a 50% interest in 
Prayon, which owns two production sites in Belgium and Pakistan; Maroc Phosphore SA, a joint 
venture between the OCP and Fauji Fertilizer Bin Qasim Limited of Pakistan, and Black Sea 
fertilizer trading company, a JV with Turkish Toros Agri-industry Company, aimed at extending 
OCP’s presence to Central Asia and the Balkans. OCP also recently established a JV with India’s 
Krishak Bharati for the development of a greenfield NPK fertiliser plant in Andhra Pradesh, India.  
 
*Put Table 3 here* 
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Sonatrach, founded in 1963, is the state-owned Algerian group, prides itself as the first integrated 
petroleum company in Africa and the 12th largest in the world. It has over 154 subsidiaries within 
and outside Algeria (49 internationally) and it generated USD63.65 billion with about 47,963 
employees in 2010. It is also a leading global gas exporter, with a pipeline network of around 
16,200km, and has, as part of its diversification strategy, invested in power generation, new and 
renewable energies, water desalination, and mining exploration and exploitation. Sonatrach 
International Holding has over 30 subsidiaries, including wholly-owned trading units in London, 
Singapore (since 1994), and Amsterdam (Sonatrading). Table 4 offers more profile information on 
Sonatrach’s, including indicative FDI milestones.  
 
*Put Table 4 here* 
Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola (Sonangol), incorporated in 1976, is state-owned oil 
and gas group that operates primarily in the upstream and downstream sectors of the petroleum 
industry, with additional interests in telecommunications, insurance and financial services and the 
training of oil industry professionals. It is a highly diversified conglomerate with more than 30 units 
and JV activities across Africa, South East Asia, Europe and North America, and it generated 
USD33.88 billion and USD3.3bn profit, with over 10,000 staff in 2011. Seemingly driven to become 
a significant international competitor, particularly in the African context, Sonangol has undertaken 
strategic investments both domestically and internationally. The latter include China Sonangol 
International Holding, a 30:70 JV with Beiya International that has assets in Nigeria, Indonesia, and 
Argentina and handles crude flows between Angola and China. More profile information, including 
indicative FDI milestones and footprint, can be seen in Table 5. 
*Put Table 5 here* 
 
 15 
 
Attijariwafa Bank, part of the Moroccan Royal family-controlled Group ONA, is one of Africa's 
largest in terms of assets. A product of a merger between Banque Commerciale du Maroc and 
Wafabank, it generated $2.57bn revenue with 14, 861 staff across 3,040 branches. Its investment 
footprint extends to over 20 countries, including MENA, West and Central Africa, China and Europe 
(where its 60 branches target the remittances of millions of Moroccan diaspora) (Euromoney, 2013). 
The first phase of its intraregional expansion focused mainly on neighboring countries and 
francophone West Africa, while the second, more matured, phase of African expansion in Africa, 
heralded by the acquisition of Barclays Egypt, prioritized such selection criteria as size of the 
national economy, population and growth prospects. Table 6 presents more profile information on 
Attijariwafa bank, including indicative FDI milestones and footprint. Attijariwafa Bank is starting to 
benefit from its operations south of the Sahara.  
  
*Put Table 6 here* 
 
Banque Centrale Populaire (BCP), established in 1961, is owned by the state of Morocco (45.4%), 
11 regional cooperative banks (22%), the ‘public’ (25%) and the Government Pension Fund vehicle, 
CDG (5%). Listed on the Casablanca Stock Exchange in 2004, the group reportedly employed 11, 
206 employees across 1250 branches in 2014. It also has 4.5 million customers and presence in 11 
African countries as well in Europe, Middle East and North America. BCP’s subsidiary, Chaabi 
Bank set up in 1972 in France, has presence in several other European countries, including Belgium, 
Spain, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. This expansive international network mainly 
targets the Moroccan diaspora and accounts for BCP’s leading position in remittance banking. BCP’s 
African footprint was facilitated via the acquisition of Ivory Coast lender, Group Banque Atlantique 
(currently 75%), which is active in Ivory Coast, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and 
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Togo. BCP also recently undertook FDI activity in the USA (representative office in Washington 
DC) – see Table 7.  
*Put Table 7 here* 
 
Ecobank Transnational Incorporated, established in 1985 by private and institutional investors from 
several African countries, reputedly the broadest reach of any African bank. It employed 20,331 staff 
in 1250 branches across 33 African and 4 non-African countries, and generated revenue of USD2.3 
billion in 2014. Profit before tax also rose by 135 per cent to USD520 million in 2014. Ranked 
Number 1 by assets in seven African markets and top 3 in fourteen others, and listed in three West 
African Stock Exchanges, Ecobank commenced FDI activity in 1989 and has expanded largely 
through the acquisition of existing banks in various countries – see Table 8 for more profile 
information. 
 
*Put Table 8 here* 
 
First Bank Holding, which dates back to 1894, has interests in commercial and investment banking, 
asset management, insurance and other financial services. It employed, in 2014, 10,464 staff in 862 
business locations across 12 countries, including eight African and four non-African markets. Its 
revenue for that year was USD2.64 billion [4], with 8.8 per cent of this coming from international 
subsidiaries. Profit before tax for the same period was USD511 million. Listed in the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange and London Stock Exchange (for Global Depositary receipts’ trading), First Bank has won 
several prestigious awards and global rankings. Its acquisition of Anglo-African Bank in 1912 was 
reportedly the first ever M&A recorded in this region (Anonymous, 2014a), and this was followed by 
entry into the UK in 1982 and more recent FDI activities in a number of African countries, France, 
China, and UAE – see Table 9. 
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*Put Table 9 here* 
 
Overall, it would appear that the foregoing profiles that the case subjects are evolving into significant 
multinational actors. The analysis now turns to the focal questions raised in the present research, as 
outlined at the end of the literature review section.  
 
Nascent African MNEs’ Extra-regional FDI: Where?  Why? 
 
The intra-case analysis, above, shows that nascent African MNEs’ OFDI activities have mainly been 
intra-regionally focused; this term, as earlier noted, is operationally used in this study to 
accommodate direct investments by North African MNEs in institutionally proximate neighbouring 
MENA countries. That said, there is still considerable evidence regarding OFDI to other Southern 
economies and more advanced markets of the ‘Global North’. This concurs with a recent report, 
which puts rising Africa’s OFDI to Southern and advanced economies at 17 and 15 per cent 
respectively (Ibeh, 2013). The analysis now focuses on these two types of extra-regional FDI. 
 
*Put Table 10 here* 
 
Table 10, above, offers a non-exhaustive list of other Southern economies targeted by nascent 
African MNEs in their OFDI activities. The study MNEs are, thus, contributing to the broader South-
South FDI flows with investment footprints in South America (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Cuba, 
Peru); South Asia (e.g. China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, South 
Korea, Turkey); Central Asia (Afghanistan, Kazakhstan); and Eastern European and Transition 
economies (Russia, Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Slovakia). 
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Regarding the why and wherefores for these South-South FDI moves, the case material summarised 
in Box 1 points to the especial relevance of market-seeking motivations. Illustrations abound, 
including Sonatrach International Holding’s 1994 establishment of a Singaporean subsidiary to 
market LPG, crude and other products in the Asia/Pacific market and LNG marketing agreement 
with Russia’s Gazprom, the world's largest exporter of natural gas; OCI’s investment in a JV in 
Brazil (with FITCO International S.A, a Brazilian fertilizer trading company) in order to trade and 
distribute fertilizer products and import urea from its Fertilizer Group; OCP’s investment in Black 
Sea Fertilizer trading company, a JV with Turkish Toros Agri-industry, aimed at extending its 
presence to Central Asia and the Balkans; Elsewedy’s recent 50 mw wind power plant in Pakistan 
and acquisition of ZPA Smart Energy a Czech manufacturer with clients such as E.ON and CEZ; and 
OCI’s partnership with and HCC Infrastructure Limited (HIL), a preeminent Indian infrastructure 
company based in Mumbai, to form a to pursue Public Private Partnerships (PPP) and Build Operate 
Transfer (BOT) projects in India. Additional indicators include Ecobank and First Bank’s setting up 
of representative offices in China apparently to facilitate trade links between China and Africa; the 
former’s strategic partnerships with the Bank of China and India’s ICICI Bank to extend services 
across their combined footprint in India and Africa; and Sonangol’s overseas offices in South East 
Asia, notably Singapore.  
 
*Put Box 1 here* 
 
There are also indications that resource-seeking motivations influenced some of the direct 
investments undertaken by Africa’s nascent MNEs in other Southern economies – see Box 2. This is 
exemplified by OCP and Sonatrach’s respective investments in a Pakistani plant that produces 
phosphate fertilizers and phosphoric acid and Peru’s Camisea upstream gas project; as well as 
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Sonangol’s investments in exploration rights in Iraq and Cuba. Sonatrach’s exploration and 
production agreement with Russia’s Gazprom also reflect a resource-seeking focus. 
 
*Put Box 2 here* 
 
On investments in more advanced economies, the identified host markets include Belgium, Canada, 
Cyprus, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, 
UK, and USA. This is particularly the case with BCP, Attijariwafa, Sonatrach and OCI, each of 
which has invested in five or more advanced economies. This level of exposure to more competitive 
and challenging global markets further underlines the international commitment of these African 
MNEs. The UK, France and Spain are among the most common ‘Northern’ destinations for African 
investments, which reflect the influence of historical and cultural ties on the investment location 
decisions of African MNEs. Nigerian financial service MNEs, e.g. First bank, have invested in the 
UK, while Moroccan MNEs - BCP, Attijariwafa - tend to target Spain and France as well as the UK 
to a lesser extent. The Netherlands and USA are also frequently targeted.  
 
A close look at the case material summarised in Boxes 3, 4 and 5 suggests the search for strategic 
assets/resources, new market opportunities and value-enhancing relationships to be the main 
motivations for understanding the upmarket FDI activities of nascent African MNEs. The quest for 
strategic assets seems to explain Elsewedy’s acquisition of the Spanish wind energy firm, M Torres 
Olvega, principally to leverage the acquired entity’s capabilities in manufacturing wind turbines and 
providing co-development, operation and maintenance services for wind farms as well as set the 
stage for the subsequent establishment of Sewedy Wind Energy Group (SWEG). Similar technology 
leveraging or asset exploitation focus also appears to explain Elsewedy’s entry into a JV with 
German company SIAG, a producer of steel and tube towers; the latter are the main component 
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required by Elsewedy for wind turbine installations in its home market. Additional indicators include 
OCP’s investments in phosphate fertilizer and phosphoric acid production plants in Belgium and 
France aimed at diversifying its supply chain and securing access to critical sources; Sonangol 
acquisition of America’s Cobalt International Energy to diversify and extend its offshore oil and gas 
assets to the Gulf of Mexico, USA; and Sonatrach’s 49:51 JV in Northern Spain, called Propanchem, 
seemingly aimed at tapping into the JV partner’s (German BASF) capabilities in propane de-
hydrogenation technology. Also, although Uganda’s Madhvani Group is not part of the present 
study, its 2005 and 2006 acquisitions of Rhodia Chemie's phosphates operations in Spain and 
Belgium respectively, reportedly to facilitate the development of phosphate deposits in Uganda, 
similarly reflect a strategic asset-seeking orientation. 
 
*Put Box 3 here* 
 
Regarding market-seeking motivations, illustrative evidence can be gleaned from Sonatrach 
International Holding’s wholly-owned trading units in London and Amsterdam, respectively 
Sonatrach Petroleum Corporation and Sonatrading Amsterdam, which were both set up to market 
piped gas and LNG to Europe and the American LNG market; as well as the wholly owned finance 
and investment Dutch subsidiary, Sonatrach Petroleum Investment Corporation and financial holding 
unit, International Petroleum Investment Partnership, which respectively focus on helping Sonatrach 
expand, consolidate and integrate its overseas operations and strategic subsidiaries, including E&P 
ventures and associated logistics and services and manage its portfolio. Ecobank subsidiaries in 
France, London, UAE and First Bank’s subsidiary in the UK, with a Paris branch, also appear to be 
underpinned by the need to develop market presence in these key financial centres. 
 
*Put Box 4 here* 
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Relationship-seeking motivations are further observed mainly in terms of the pull exerted by actual 
and potential links with pro-Africa companies and individuals, including Diaspora or non-resident 
Africans, in African banks’ expansion into Europe, North America and other major host countries of 
African immigrant communities. These nascent financial service MNEs typically seek to develop 
relationships with organisations and individuals in these focal markets who have current or historical 
links with Africa, or are seeking to initiate such links – see Box 5.  
   
*Put Box 5 here* 
Taken together, the case evidence presented above points to the importance of market-, 
strategic/resource and relationship-seeking motives in explaining nascent African MNEs’ 
engagement in South-South and South-North FDI. The study MNEs pursued their market-seeking 
objectives through investing in revenue generating platforms in both the Global South and the 
advanced North. Nascent MNEs, notably Elsewedy, OCI and mining giants, Sonatrach, Sonangol 
and OCP, also expressed their strategic-asset/resource seeking orientation through asset augmenting 
FDI moves in developing as well as advanced economies. There is some suggestion from the present 
study’s limited evidence that nascent African MNEs with primarily strategic asset- and relationship-
seeking motivations largely favour upmarket, advanced economy, FDI locations, while those with 
dominant market-seeking focus prioritise intra-regional and Southern FDI market opportunities. The 
latter observation may, however, vary by industry; oil and gas MNEs, for example, are largely bound 
to pursue extra-regional markets given the inadequate level of demand for their main products intra-
regionally. Not surprisingly, efficiency seeking motivation appears not to be particularly salient in 
the extra-regional FDI activities of nascent African MNEs. Elsewedy’s investments in production 
facilities in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, however, offer the closest examples. 
 
 
How Advisable is African MNEs’ engagement in extra-regional FDI?  
 
As might be expected, there are credible arguments in favour of, and against, the involvement of 
nascent African MNEs in OFDI outside their home region. Some of the pertinent reflections are now 
presented.  
 
On the plus side, it would appear that such upmarket FDI is facilitating nascent African MNEs’ 
access to critical technologies, knowledge capabilities and related strategic assets that they need to 
augment, upgrade and catch-up. This aligns with Mathews’ (2002, 2006) earlier noted LLL 
framework. Notably, Elsewedy’s initial foothold in the increasingly important wind energy business 
and the development of the Sewedy Wind Energy Group would seem to have stemmed from its 
acquisition of a Spanish specialist provider of wind turbines and wind farms, M Torres Olvega. The 
JV with SIAG of Germany, a producer of steel and tube towers, similarly availed Elsewedy of 
critical capabilities for manufacturing tube towers required for wind turbine installation projects in 
its home market. This, interestingly, suggests some additionality from extra-regional FDI 
augmenting Elsewedy’s home market, echoing evidence from previous EMNE research, notably 
Chinese, about the leveraging of acquired entities to bolster operations at home (Yueh, 2012). 
Similarly, OCI’s acquisition of the Iowa Fertilizer Company and subsequent contract for its 
Construction Group to build a new green-field nitrogen fertilizer plant in southeastern Iowa 
reportedly availed OCI of access to the production process technologies from Kellogg Brown and 
Root, Stamicarbon BV (Maire Tecnimont Group) and ThyssenKrupp Uhde. Related arguments apply 
to OCP’s investments in phosphate fertilizer and phosphoric acid production plants in Belgium and 
France; Sonangol acquisition of gas assets in the US Gulf from America’s Cobalt International 
Energy; and Sonatrach’s propane de-hydrogenation JV with BASF of Germany in Northern Spain.  
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A crucial complementary benefit of these extra-regional FDI moves is the opportunity they offer to 
nascent African MNEs in terms of enriching their portfolio of collaborative relationships with even 
more impactful, resource-laden international players. For example, Sonatrrach’s JV in Peru enabled 
it to enter into strategically advantageous collaboration with partners, including Tecgas NV, 
Pluspetrol (Argentina), Hunt Oil (USA), SK Corporation (South Korea), GDF Suez-Tractebel SA 
(Franco-Belgian), and Grana y Montero SAA (Peru). These add to the earlier discussed benefits of 
developing and sustaining relationships with the African Diaspora and pro-African organisations in 
Europe, North America and elsewhere.   
 
There is another important sense in which such extra-regional investments appear to beneficially 
widen the strategic and market options available to the nascent African MNEs; this is by enabling 
them to seek diversified market opportunities further afield, in more lucrative, albeit competitive, 
advanced economies. Such market diversification arguably limits future revenue exposure to any one 
region or geographic market clusters. This tends to be particularly important when situations within 
their home region (e.g. the Arab Spring, civil conflicts, economic recession etc.) narrow the range 
and size of opportunities available to these firms locally or regionally. OCI, for example, appeared to 
have mitigated some of the effects of the post-Arab Spring challenges in its home country by 
realigning its global structure and shifting organisational emphasis away from Egypt and toward 
international subsidiaries, notably in the Netherlands and the US (Iowa and Gulf of Mexico). 
Notably, its Construction Group reportedly secured a turnkey engineering, procurement and 
construction contract worth over USD1 billion from an acquired entity, the Iowa Fertilizer Company. 
The reported uptick in revenue generated from Europe, North America and other regions (e.g. 78% 
increase in the Asian segment) evidently mitigated the overall decline in OCI financial outcomes 
during the particularly challenging 2011-2013 period. So was OCI Fertilizer Holding’s reported 
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disposal of its 16.8% stake in the US-based Gavillion Group to the Japanese Marubeni Corporation 
for over USD600 million, a hefty premium on the USD340 million paid three years earlier.  
 
Contrary arguments regarding extra-regional FDI, however, exist. It is, for instance, strongly 
contended that expansion to more institutionally proximate intraregional markets tends to yield 
comparable or better market diversification benefits. The significant boost reportedly achieved by 
Elsewedy from the infrastructure boom and attendant demand for housing, power generation, cables 
and other electrical products in the neighbouring Gulf Cooperation Countries could be cited for 
illustrative purposes. So was Elsewedy’s intensified targeting, in the post-Arab Spring period of parts 
of the MENA region and the African continent, where rising demand for electricity were creating 
opportunities and boosting revenues in the medium term (e.g. share of USD1bn deal to repair Libyan 
war-ravaged electricity grid and infrastructure). There is also some suggestion in the literature (e.g. 
Selmiar and Newenham-Kahindi, 2017) that shared institutional, including cultural, background with 
host markets may enhance MNEs’ effectiveness in managing relations and delivering sustainable 
development goals with local communities.  
 
Furthermore, extra-regional FDI is posited as out of sync with the increasingly observed divestments 
of traditional MNEs from their so-called non-core markets (e.g. European financial services MNEs, 
including Barclays, selling off African subsidiaries, while major African players like South Africa’s 
Standard Bank are divesting from most of its extra-regional operations to focus on African markets 
(African Business, 2017), and insensitive to the widely noted struggles of EMNEs in integrating 
acquired upmarket entities and capturing envisaged value. The lowering of OCI Iowa subsidiary’s 
revenue bonds, from BB-minus to B-plus, by Fitch Ratings owing, reportedly, to escalating costs and 
construction delays is an example of such upmarket FDI snags, so is Attajariwafa CEO’s bemoaning 
of the higher associated costs and regulatory burden of operating a “fully French bank” (Euromoney, 
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2013). It must be noted, however, that such difficulties could also be encountered by the advanced 
economy partner. For example, Sonangol’s JV with Portuguese state-owned lender Caixa Geral de 
Depositos, Banco para Promocao e Desenvolvimento fell through apparently because the Portuguese 
partner’s reconsidered the USD261 million investment after the country’s Eurozone crisis-induced 
bailout. 
 
It can be seen from preceding paragraphs that the advisability or otherwise of nascent African 
MNEs’ involvement in direct investments outside their home region is not an easily resolved matter. 
The next and final section of the paper will, however, seek to draw some conclusions.   
 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
This paper has presented and discussed preliminary evidence on the extra-regional FDI activities of 
nascent MNEs from rising Africa, including the whys and wherefores of their so doing. It captures 
the tentative steps of these nascent African MNEs in South-South and South-North investment 
contexts and contributes, albeit, modestly, to the global discourse on the merits or otherwise of extra-
regional FDI, including probable additionality to home economies. These MNEs’ forays beyond 
their intraregional markets in search of market opportunities, strategic assets/resources and value 
enhancing relationships are welcome, and concerted policy effort is needed to support their 
sustainable development.  Although not always consistent, previous studies on the impact of FDI on 
home economies largely suggest favourable net effects on employment, technological and 
managerial knowledge among others (Hejazi and Pauly, 2003; Bitzer and Gorg, 2005; Buckley et al. 
2007; Moran, 2007). The counter arguments presented in the preceding section are not without merit, 
but a more holistic and strategic view ought to factor in the positive concomitants of direct exposure 
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to more advanced markets, including learning/technology spill overs, access to ‘richer’ markets, 
strategic assets/resources, as well as the associated opportunity of engaging with and embedding 
global best practice (Ibeh, Awa, Makhmadshoev, and Madichie, 2018). Intraregional investments by 
nascent African MNEs should continue to attract priority attention, but selective and strategic extra-
regional FDI, undertaken with an eye on further global competitiveness, also requires appropriate 
policy support. Indeed, the increasing dominance of the digital economy, with its vastly enhanced 
facilities for borderless digital internationalisation (UNCTAD, 2017; Ibeh and Lloyd-Reason, 2017), 
and the proliferation of MNE affiliates with blurred national identities or “multiple passports” 
(UNCTAD, 2016) are making regional distinctions less relevant.  
 
Policy makers should guide Africa’s nascent MNEs to prioritise the acquisition of advantage 
generating capabilities, including habitual upgrading, continuing innovation and relentless learning 
(Ibeh and Makhmadshoev, 2018). Such foregrounding and capability anchors at the home and 
regional fronts would, in time, help them develop breakthrough brand reputation, or augment their 
brand equity to a level that neutralises the effects of unfavourable country-of origin perceptions. Or 
even better, attract value-seeking private equity firms to partner with them to effectively reach global 
markets. White elephant, prestige-seeking multinational expansion driven mainly by ego and puff, 
with questionable firm-specific capability anchors, should rightly be discouraged. However, policy 
makers must, following due diligence, not shy away from championing ambitious upstarts and global 
start-ups, including digital economy entrepreneurs, that suggest the vision and strategic intent to take 
on the world, and the spine to conquer an identified global niche and create their own narratives. To 
do otherwise is to deny the possibility that the next game changers might emerge from the 
developing world, including Africa. This is particularly important given the vast and increasing 
opportunities that the digital economy and digital internationalisation present to firms of varying 
demographics and geographies (UNCTAD, 2016; Ibeh and Lloyd-Reason, 2017). 
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Development-promoting institutions, including multilateral global and regional development 
partners, notably African regional bodies, UN agencies (e.g. UNCTAD) and the World Bank Group, 
should steer and support African governments and policy makers towards embracing an 
appropriately nuanced outward-oriented development strategy. This must entail, inter alia, working 
with and assisting these actors to establish or upgrade their investment policy infrastructure, 
including in-house capacity for investment policy making, redress the mixed policy signals on OFDI. 
African governments that are yet to enter into appropriate bilateral and multilateral investment 
treaties should also be encouraged to take the necessary steps in that regard in order to obviate unfair 
treatment of their current and future MNEs and negotiate their access to as much level playing field 
as possible (Ibeh, 2013; UNCTAD, 2017). African governments and policy makers should also be 
facilitated to craft a template for evaluating and segmenting African firms based on their readiness to 
undertake OFDI, intra-regionally or extra-regionally. Such a template should guide the design and 
provision of appropriately tailored support to the identified categories of African firms. This is likely 
to advance the crucial task of prioritising scarce support resources to African companies with better 
prospects of generating net positive benefits to their home economies. 
 
Researchers and policy makers are further challenged to invest continuing effort to understanding the 
net impact of nascent African MNEs’ OFDI on their organisational development at home, regional 
and Diaspora economies. Such improved understanding of additionality and net effects would 
fruitfully advance scholarly discussions and managerial and policy decision making, whilst also 
informing the design and deployment of assistance programmes by various stakeholders. 
 
 6 
 
REFERENCES 
 
African Business (2017), No major surprises despite challenging environment, October, 445: 31-34.  
Aronoff, C. (1975) ‘The rise of the behavioural perspective in selected general management 
textbooks: an empirical investigation and content analysis’, Academy of Management Journal, 
18(4): 753–768. 
Aulakh, P. S. (Ed.) (2007). Special issue on emerging multinationals from developing economies: 
motivations, paths and performance. Journal of International Management, 13(3), 235-402. 
Aybar, B. and Ficici, A. (2009). Cross-border acquisitions and firm value: an analysis of emerging-
market multinationals. Journal of International Business Studies, 40, 1317-1338. 
Aykut, Dilek, and Dilep Ratha (2003), “South-South FDI flows: How Big Are They?” Transnational 
Corporations 13 (1): 149–176.  
Barney, J.B. (1991). “Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage”. Journal of 
Management, 17(1), 99-121. 
Bartunek, J. M., Bobko, P. and Venkatraman, N. V. (1993). Toward Innovation and Diversity in 
Management Research Methods. Academy of Management Journal, 36, 1362-1373. 
Beck, T. and Cull, R. (2013). Banking in Africa, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) 
Working Paper, WPS/2013/16, University of Oxford, Oxford.  
Birkinshaw, J., Bresman, H. and Nobel, R. (2010). Knowledge transfer in international acquisitions: 
A retrospective. Journal of International Business Studies, 41, 21-26.  
Bitzer, J., and H. Görg (2005), “The impact of FDI on industry performance”, International Trade 
No. 0505003, Econ WPA, Nottingham University. 
Blomström, M and Kokko, A. (1998), “Multinational corporations and spillovers”, Journal of 
Economics Surveys 12: 247–277. 
Boston Consulting Group (BCG) (2010). The African Challengers: Global Competitors Emerge 
from the Overlooked Continent, available at:  http://www.bcg.com/documents/file44 610.pdf 
(accessed May 2012). 
Buckley, P. J., Clegg, L. J., Cross, A. R., Liu, X., Voss, H., and Zheng, P. (2007). The determinants 
of Chinese outward foreign direct investment. Journal of International Business Studies, 38, 499–
518.  
Casanova, L. (2004), “East Asian, European, and North American Multinational Firm Strategies in  
Latin America”, Business and Politics 6 (1).  
Case Data (2018), Distilled from a myriad of sources too numerous to itemise. 
 7 
Caves, R.E. (1971). Industrial corporations: The industrial economics of foreign investment. 
Economica, 38, pp. 1 – 27. 
Chen, V.Z., Li, J., and Shapiro, D.M. (2012). International reverse spillover effects on parent firms: 
Evidence from emerging-market MNEs in developed markets. European Management Journal, 
30(3), 204-218. 
Citigroup (2005). Emerging Market Acquirers in Developed Markets – A Growing Force, Citigroup, 
New York. 
Chung, W and Yeaple, S.  (2004) “International knowledge sourcing: Evidence from US firms 
expanding abroad”, mimeo.  
Cuervo-Cazurra, A. and Genc, M. (2008). Transforming disadvantages into advantages: developing-
country MNEs in the lease developed countries. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(6), 
957-979.  
Del Sol, P., and Kogan, J. (2004). Regional Competitive Advantage Based on Pioneering Economic 
Reforms: The Case of Chilean FDI. Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile, Mimeo, 4 June. 
Driffield, N. and Love, J. (2007), “Linking FDI Motivation and Host Economy Productivity Effects: 
Conceptual and Empirical Analysis, Journal of International Business Studies 38(2), 460-473 
Dunning, J.H. (1977). “Trade, location of economic activity and the MNE: a search for an eclectic 
approach”, in Ohlin, B., Hasselborn, P. and Wijkman, P.M. (Eds.), The International Allocation of 
Economic Activity, Macmillan, London.  
Dunning, J.H. (1993), Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, Addison-Wesley, 
Wokingham. 
Dunning, J.H. and Lundan, S.M. (2008), Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, Edward 
Elgar. 
Dunning, J.H. and Lundan, S.M. (2008), Institutions and the OLI Paradigm of the Multinational 
Enterprise, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 25(4). 
Ernst and Young (2012). Building Bridges: Ernst and Young’s 2012 Competitiveness Survey, Africa. 
Available at: http://www.ey.com/ZA/en/Issues/Business-environment/2012-Africa- attractiveness-
survey (Accessed 10 Dec, 2012). 
Euromoney (2013), Attijariwafa stakes claims south of the Sahara, 43(535): 9. 
Frost, S. (2004), “Chinese Outward Direct Investment in Southeast Asia: How Much and What are 
the Regional Implications?” South-South East Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, no. 
67, Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong,  
Gaffney, N., Cooper, D., Kedia, B., and Clampit, J. (2014). Institutional transitions, global mindset, 
and EMNE internationalization. European Management Journal, 32(3), 383-391. 
 8 
Ghauri, P. (2004). Designing and conducting case studies in international business research. In R. 
Piekkari and C. Welch (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research methods for international 
business. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.  
Girma, S. and Gorg, H. (2004), “Outsourcing, Foreign Ownership and Productivity: Evidence from 
UK Establishment Data”, Review of International Economics 12(5): 817-832. 
Goldstein, A. (2006). Emerging Multinationals in the Global Economy, OECD Development Centre, 
Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire. 
Goldstein, A. (2007). Multinational companies from emerging economies: composition, 
conceptualization and direction in the global economy, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire. 
Goldstein, A. (2008). The internationalization of Indian companies: the case of Tata. Centre for 
Advanced Study on India (CASI) Working Paper, (08-02). 
Hejazi W and Pauly P (2003). Motivations for FDI and domestic capital formation”, Journal of 
International Business Studies 34: 282-89. 
Hendriks, G. (2017), The sustainable development effects of investment by emerging-market 
multinationals: shaping beneficial outcomes for home and host country, Transnational 
Corporations, 24(3): 76-88. 
Holsti, O. (1968). Content Analysis. In G. Lindzey and Aronson, E. (Eds,), The Handbook of Social 
Psychology, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA. 
Hymer, S.H. (1960). The International Operations of National Firms: A Study of Direct Investment. 
PhD Thesis, MIT University. 
Ibeh, K.I.N. (2009). What do we know about Indigenous Transnational Corporations from Rising 
Africa? Why do they Matter? Draft Report to the Investment Climate Advisory Services, World 
Bank Group, Washington DC, USA, August. 
Ibeh, K. I. N. (2013). African Multinationals: Southern Multinational Corporations from Rising 
Africa. Draft Report to the Investment Climate Advisory Services, World Bank Group, 
Washington, DC. April. 
Ibeh, K.I.N. (2015), Rising Africa and its nascent multinational corporations. In I. Adeleye et al. 
(eds.), The Changing Dynamics of International Business in Africa, London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Ibeh, K., Awa, I., Makhmadshoev, D. and Madichie, N. (2017), Nascent Multinationals from West 
Africa: Are Their Foreign Direct Investment Motivations Any Different? International Marketing 
Review (In Press). 
Ibeh, K.I.N. and Lloyd-Reason, L (2017), “Digital Technologies and SME Internationalisation: A Policy 
Paper” Report to the OECD, Local Government and Employment Development Programme, May. 
Ibeh, K.I.N. and Makhmadshoev, D. (2018), Post-Acquisition Integration Behaviour of Nascent African 
 9 
Multinational Enterprises, Journal of Business Research, Forthcoming. 
Ibeh, K.I.N., Young. S. and Lin H.C. (2004), “Information Technology and the electronics firms from 
Taiwan Province of China in the United Kingdom: emerging trends and implications”, Transnational 
Corporations Journal, 13(3), 21-52. 
IMF (2015a). Pan-African Banks: opportunities and challenges for cross border oversight, 
Washington DC.  
Johansson, J. and Vale, J-E. (1977) ‘The internationalization process of the firm – a model of 
knowledge development and increasing foreign market commitments’, Journal of 
International Business Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp.23–32. 
Kalona K. and Sulstarova A. (2010). Modeling Russian outward FDI. Journal of International 
Management. 16, 131–142. 
Klein, S. and Wöcke, A. (2007). Emerging global contenders: the South African experience, Journal 
of International Management, 13(3), 319-317.   
KPMG (2013). Financial Services in Africa, KPMG Financial Services Team. 
Kumar, N. (2009). Emerging MNCs: Trends. Patterns, and Determinants of Outward FDI by Indian 
Enterprises. In R. Rajan, Kumar, R. and Virgili, N. (Eds.), New Dimensions of Economic 
Globalization: Surge of Outward Foreign Direct Investment from Asia. World Scientific, 
Singapore. 
Li, P. P. (2007). Toward an integrated theory of multinational evolution: The evidence of Chinese 
multinational enterprises as latecomers. Journal of International Management, 13(3), 296–318.  
Luo, Y., and Tung, R. (2007). International expansion of emerging market enterprises:  a springboard 
perspective. Journal of International Business Studies, 38, 481-98. 
Madhok, A. and Keyhani, M. (2012). Acquisitions as entrepreneurship: asymmetries, opportunities, 
and the internationalization of multinationals from emerging economies. Global Strategy Journal, 
2, 26-40.  
Mathews, J. A. (2002). Dragon Multinationals - A new model for global growth, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
Mathews, J.A. (2006). Catch-up strategies and the latecomer effect in industrial development. New 
Political Economy, 11(3), 313-335. 
Marchand, M. (2015). When the South takes over the North: Dynamics of up-market integrations by 
emerging multinationals. Management, 18(1), 31-53.  
Miles, M. B. and Hubermann, A. M. (1994). Analysing Qualitative Data: An Expanded Sourcebook, 
2nd edition, Sage Publications, Newbury Park. 
Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis (2
nd
 ed). Sage.  
 10 
Mirza, H. (2000) The Globalisation of Business and East Asian Developing-Country Multinationals. 
In N. Hood and S. Young (eds) The Globalization of Multinational Enterprise Activity and 
Economic Development, London: Macmillan. 
Mol, M. and Birkinshaw, J.M. (2014). “Role of external involvement in the creation of management 
innovations”, Organization Studies, 35(9), 1287-1312.  
Moran, T. (2007), “How to Investigate the Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Development 
and Use the Results to Guide Policy.” In Brookings Trade Forum, edited by S. Collins, 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press. 
Nayir D.Z., and Vaiman V. (2012). Emerging multinationals: globalization paths and management 
styles. European Journal of International Management, 6(3), 243-247.  
Ngugi, B. (2016). Kenya overtakes SA as biggest investor in African countries, July 28.    
Parente, R. C., Cyrino, Á. B., Spohr, N., and Vasconcelos, F. C. D. (2013). Lessons learned from 
Brazilian multinationals’ internationalization strategies. Business Horizons, 56(4), 453-463. 
Peng, M.W. (2012). The global strategy of emerging multinational from China. Global Strategy 
Journal, 2, 97-107.   
Penrose, E. (1959) The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, London: Basil Blackwell. 
Pietrobelli, C. Rabellotti, R. and Sanfilippo, M. (2010). The 'Marco Polo' Effect: Chinese FDI in 
Italy. International Economics Programme Paper No. 4, Chatham House, London. 
Poulis, K., Poulis, E. and Plakoniyannaki, E. (2013). “The role of context in case study selection: An 
international business perspective”, International Business Review, 22(2), 304-314. 
Rao-Nicholson, R., Khan, Z., and Stokes, P. (2016). Making great minds think alike: Emerging 
market multinational firms’ leadership effects on targets’ employee psychological safety after 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. International Business Review, 25, 103-113.  
Ramamurti, R., and Singh, J. V. (Eds.). (2009). Emerging multinationals in emerging markets. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  
Rugman, A.M. (1980). A New Theory of the Multinational Enterprise: Internationalization vs 
Internalization. Columbia Journal of World Business, 15/1, 23-39. 
Rugman, A. and Li, J. (2007). Will China’s multinationals succeed globally or regionally? European 
Management Journal, 25(5), 333-343.  
Rugman, A. and Verbeke, A. (2008). A new perspective on the regional and global strategies of 
multinational services firms. Management International Review, 48(4): 397–411. 
Salas-Porras, A. (1998). The Strategies Pursued by Mexican Firms in their Efforts to Become Global 
Players. CEPAL Review, 65, 133–153. 
 11 
Sarathy R. (2013). Cross-borders acquisitions by EMNEs. In P.J. Williamson, R. Ramamurti, A. 
Fleury and M.T.L. Fleury (Eds) (2013). The Competitive Advantage of Emerging Market 
Multinationals. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.  
Selmier, W.T. II and Newenham-Kahindi, A. (2017), Under African skies – mining TNCs in Africa 
and the Sustainable Development Goals, 24(3): 119-135.  
Sim, A. B. and Pandian, J. R. (2003). Emerging Asian MNEs and Their Internationalization 
Strategies – Case-Study Evidence on Taiwanese and Singaporean Firms. Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management, 20(1), 27–50. 
Sydserff, R. and Weetman, P. (2002). Developments in Content Analysis: A Transitivity Index and 
DICTION Scores. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 15(4), 523–545. 
UNCTAD (2005). Firms in Developing Countries’ Rapidly Expanding Foreign Investment, 
Transnational Activities, Press release UNCTAD/PRESS/PR/2005/018, May 30. 
UNCTAD (2005b), “Firms in Developing Countries’ Rapidly Expanding Foreign Investment, 
Transnational Activities.” Press release UNCTAD/PRESS/PR/2005/018, 30 May 
UNCTAD (2011), World Investment Report, UNCTAD, Geneva. 
UNCTAD (2012), World Investment Report, UNCTAD, Geneva. 
UNCTAD (2015). World Investment Report, UNCTAD, Geneva. 
UNCTAD (2016), World Investment Report, UNCTAD, Geneva. 
UNCTAD (2017), World Investment Report, UNCTAD, Geneva. 
Vahtra, P. and Liuhto.K. (2004), “Expansion or Exodus? Foreign Operations of Russia’s Largest 
Corporations”, Electronic Publications of Pan-European Institute, vol. 8. Turku, Finland: Turku 
School of Economics and Business Administration. 
Verhoef, G. (2016). Latecomer challenge: African Multinationals from the periphery. 
Economic Research Southern Africa (ERSA) working paper 570, January.  
Welch, C. and Piekkari, R. (2017). “How should we (not) judge the ‘quality’ of qualitative research? 
A reassessment of current evaluative criteria in International Business”, Journal of World 
Business, 52, 714-725.  
Welch, C., Piekkari, R., Plakoyiannaki, E. and Paavilainen-Mantymaki (2011). “Theorising from 
case studies: Towards a pluralist future for international business research”, Journal of 
International Business Studies, 42, 740-762.  
Yin, R. K. (2003). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 
CA. 
Yueh L. (2012). China’s Going Out, Bringing in Policy: The Geo-economics of China’s rise. IISS 
(The International Institute of Strategic Studies) seminar paper.  
 12 
TABLES 
 
 
Table 1: Elsewedy Electric’s Profile and FDI Activities 
 
Industry Diversified Manufacturing - electrical, renewable energy, telecoms 
Established 1984 
Employees  12,000 
Ownership Elsewedy family (64%); Free float (34%); Private investors (2%) 
Home Country Egypt 
Physical Network  Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, 
Niger, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
UAE, Yemen; 
Czech Republic, Hong Kong, India, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia; 
Spain, The Netherlands. 
Performance 
Indicators/ Metrics  
Earnings USD2.1bn (2012);  
Profit Before Tax USD160m;  
Indicative FDI 
Activities/Footprint 
Subsidiaries 
Elsewedy Cables (Syria)  
Sudanese Egyptian Electric (Sudan)  
PSP (Turnkey power plant, Saudi Arabia); 
Electric Transformer plant (Zambia);  
Electric Cables plant (USD50m, Algeria);  
Power Generation plants (3) (USD484.5m) (Angola); 
Solera, Solar projects (Liberia & Sudan); 
JVs  
Power cables plant (USD42m) (70%, with Hassan & Massoud) (Yemen); 
Power plant -build and operate (USD169m with Arab Contractors) (Iraq); 
Electric Transformer plant (95.7%, with Lagos State Govt (Nigeria); 
Sewedy Wind Energy Group (30%, with German’s SIAG; acquired the 
wind division of M. Torres Olvega for USD56m) (2008);   
Electricity Grid works (USD1bn contracts, part of a consortium) (Libya) 
Distribution network  
Europe  
Representative offices  
Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait,  
Accolades 
(selected) 
Best African Company of the Year Award, 2017 (Africa CEO Forum); 
Largest Cables producer in the MENA region.  
 
Source: Case Data 
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Table 2: Orascom Construction Industries’ Profile and FDI Activities 
 
Industry Construction, Fertilizer and Chemicals 
Established 1950 
Employees  12,000 
Ownership Sawiri’s Family (controlling stake)  
Home Country Egypt 
Physical Network  Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, Tunisia, Bahrain, Iraq, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
UAE;  
Afghanistan, Brazil, India;  
Belgium, Cyprus, the Netherlands, Switzerland, USA 
Performance 
Indicators/ Metrics  
Earnings USD5.5bn  
 
Indicative FDI 
Activities/Footprint 
Wholly Owned Subsidiaries  
Weitz Co, Iowa;  
Contrack International (Virginia, USA) (e.g. the USD1bn SIDRA 
Medical and Research Centre in Doha); 
Orascom Saudi Limited (e.g. USD450m Infrastructure work); 
Petrochemical Complex in Oran (Algeria);  
Gas Turbine power plant (USD363m Iraq);  
OCI International Cyprus; 
JVs  
Sorfert Algérie (USD1.9bn) (with Sonatrach) (Algéria);  
Nuclear Power projects (with Arab Contractors) Middle East; Shams Abu 
Dhabi Gate District Towers project (USD150m) (with Arabian Sea 
Foundation, Hydra Commercial, Sorouh Real Estate and Capital 
Investment);  
Civil Works and Facilities, Ruwais (USD146m, with Tecnimont 
SpA/Samsung (Abu Dhabi);  
El Merk Central Processing Facility, Berkine Basin (USD280m, with 
Bentini of Italy and Petrofac International (Algeria);  
BISEX Group, Belgium (50%, with Al-Muhaidib Contracting) (e.g. 
USD400m Al Safooh Transit System Dubai, with Alstom; USD673m 
Wastewater Treatment plants Abu Dhabi & Al Ain, with Veolia Water; 
EUR 380m King Abdullah Sports City near Jeddah; USD675m Doha 
Convention Center & Tower, phase IIB; 
USD1.3bn Cleveland Clinic, Abu Dhabi, 60:40 JV with Samsung). 
 
Source: Case Data 
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Table 3: Office Chérifien des Phosphates’ (OCP) Profile and FDI Activities 
 
Industry Mining 
Established 1920 
Employees 20,000 (2015) 
Ownership Moroccan’s government (controlling stake);  
Home Country Morocco 
Physical Network  Gabon, Iran 
Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Turkey;  
Belgium, USA.  
Performance Indicators/ 
Metrics 
Earnings USD5bn (2015) 
Indicative FDI 
Activities/Footprint 
JV  
Greenfield NPK Fertiliser plant, with Krishak Bharati (Andhra 
Pradesh, India) (2016); 
Fertiliser plant (with the government of Gabon (2014) 
 
Source: Case Data 
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Table 6: Attijariwafa Bank’s Profile and FDI Activities 
 
Industry Financial Services 
Employees  14861 
Ownership Moroccan Royal Family (controlling stake);  
Home Country Morocco 
Physical Network  Burkina Faso, Cameroun, Congo Brazzaville, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, 
Guinea Bissau, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Tunisia, Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, UAE; 
China; 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, UK. 
Performance Indicators/ 
Metrics  
Earnings USD2.57bn;  
Profit USD558m; USD28m from Cote d’Ivoire (2016); 
Tier 1 capital of USD4.21bn; Assets USD42.3bn (2016) 
Indicative FDI 
Activities/Footprint 
Subsidiaries 
Banque du Sud (35.5% from the Tunisian government); 
Tunisia (with Banque Sénégalo-Tunisienne); 
CBAO, Senegal’s second ranked bank (79.15%);  
BIM, Malian lender (51%);  
Former Credit Agricole businesses in Congo Brazzaville, Ivory Coast, 
Cameroon, Gabon and Senegal (2008); 
Barclays Egypt (2017); 
Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Mali; Guinea-Bissau; 
Attijariwafa Europe - Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the 
Netherlands, UK;  
Branches - Libya, Saudi Arabia, UAE 
Representative Office 
China 
Accolades (selected) Best Bank in Africa 2017 (Euromoney). 
 
Source: Case Data 
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Table 4:  Sonatrach’s Profile and FDI Activities 
 
Industry Extractive 
Established 1963 
Employees  47,963 
Ownership Algerian government (controlling stake);  
Home Country Algeria 
Physical Network  Angola, Chad, Egypt, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Tunisia, 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen; 
Bolivia, Brazil, China, Peru, Singapore, Slovenia, South Korea, Turkey; 
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, The 
Netherlands, UK, USA; 
Indicative FDI 
Activities/Footprint 
Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries (finance, investment and portfolio 
management) 
Sonatrach Petroleum Investment Corp. (the Netherlands); 
International Petroleum Investment Partnership - (the Netherlands);  
Gas Plant JVs 
Propanchem, with BASF (Northern Spain);  
Propane dehydrogenation plant, with Bayegan & Rönesans (Turkey) 
Camisea gas project (10%, Peru);  
with Anadarko (Houston, USA); 
Exploration and Production (E&P) JVs  
With Oil India Ltd, National Oil, Algeria and Indian Oil (Libya); 
With Agip (Yemen); 
With India's ONGC and Reliance Industries (Iraq); 
Others: Syria, Chad, Niger (Kafra), Angola, the Gulf of Mexico; 
Refining Operations (Mauritania, Tunisia, Sudan, Brazil, Bolivia, and 
Canada - stake in Diamond Shamrock);  
Independent Power Plant JVs (in Turkey and Other markets) 
Pipeline JVs 
Galsi 900km Enrico Matei with Eni affiliate (to Italy);  
The NIGAL, with Nigeria’s NNPC and the government of Niger (Trans-
Saharan gas pipeline);  
Medgaz (42%, Pedro Duran Farrel with Spain’s Cepsa Gas);  
 
Source: Case Data 
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Table 5: Sonangol’s Profile and FDI Activities 
 
Industry Extractive 
Established 1976 
Employees  10,000 
Ownership Angolan government (controlling stake);  
Home Country Angola 
Physical Network  Cape Verde, Congo Brazzaville, Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe, Zaire, 
Iraq; 
Cuba, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Singapore;  
Portugal, Switzerland, UK, USA 
Performance Indicators/ 
Metrics  
Earnings USD33.88bn (2012) 
Profit before Tax USD3.3bn (2012) 
Indicative FDI 
Activities/Footprint 
Exploration and Production JVs 
Sonangol E&P International Ltd (25%, with Cobalt International 
Energy, Gulf of Mexico); 
With Tullow, Ireland & Addax, Switzerland (10%, Gabon); 
Amorim Energia (45%, with Galp Energia, Portugal);  
Others: Iraq and Syria.  
Marketing JVs  
Enco Sarl (40%, Sao Tome e Principe);  
Enacol (32.5%, Cape Verde);  
Sopor Portugal (49%, Portugal);  
Sonangol Congo (60%, DR Congo);  
China Sonangol Intl. Holding (70%, with Beiya Intl.) (China); 
Refining Subsidiaries 
LNG plant (Northern Zaire).  
Other JVs  
Banco Africano de Investimentos (BAI), Portugal;  
Banco do Comercio e Industria (BCI), Portugal; 
Millennium BCP, Portugal; 
Overseas Offices - Congo, China, USA, UK, and Singapore; 
Other Assets - Nigeria, Indonesia, and Argentina. 
 
Source: Case Data 
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Table 7: BCP Profile and FDI Activities 
 
Industry Financial Services 
Established 1961 
Employees  11,206 
Ownership Moroccan’s government (controlling stake);  
Home Country Morocco 
Physical Network  Benin, Burkina Faso, Central Afr. Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, UAE; 
China;  
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Italy, Netherlands, 
Spain, Switzerland, UK, USA. 
Performance Indicators/ 
Metrics  
Earnings USD1.289bn (2016);  
Profit before Tax USD300m (2016). 
Tier 1 Capital USD3.5bn; Assets USD34.7bn (2016) 
Indicative FDI 
Activities/Footprint 
Subsidiaries 
Chaabi Bank, France (1972) - Belgium, Spain, Italy, Germany, the 
Netherlands;  
British Arab Commercial Bank (UK); 
Union des Banques Arabes et Françaises (France); 
Banca UBAE (Italy); 
Group Banque Atlantique (2011) - Ivory Coast, Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo; 
Representative Office  
Washington DC, USA (2017) 
Accolade (selected) African Banker of the Year, 2015 
 
Source: Case Data 
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Table 8: Ecobank’s Profile and FDI Activities 
 
Industry Financial Services 
Established 1985 
Employees  19,000 
Ownership Public  
Home Country Togo 
Physical Network  Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Central African Rep., Chad, Congo Brazzaville, DRC, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & 
Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe; 
China, UAE; 
France, UK. 
Performance Indicators/ 
Metrics  
Profit before Tax USD205m (2016); 
Assets USD20.5bn; Tier 1 Capital USD2.01bn (2016) 
Indicative FDI 
Activities/Footprint 
Subsidiaries 
Togo, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Benin (1988-1990); 
Burkina Faso, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal,  
Cameroon (1998-2001); 
Sierra Leone, Chad, Central African Republic, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Congo Brazzaville, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Malawi, Rwanda, 
Guinea Bissau, Burundi, Cape Verde, Gambia, Kenya, Gabon, 
Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia (2006-2009);  
South Africa, Angola, Zimbabwe, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, South 
Sudan, Mozambique (2009-2014) 
Representative Offices 
Paris (EBI SA), Johannesburg, Dubai, London (2009-2014). 
Accolades (selected) Best Digital Bank in Africa 2017 (Euromoney); 
Retail Bank of the Year 2015 (Global Retail Banking Awards) 
 
Source: Case Data 
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Table 9: First Bank’s Profile and FDI Activities 
 
Industry Financial Services 
Established 1894 
Employees  10464 (2014) 
Ownership Public  
Home Country Nigeria 
Physical Network  Dem. Rep. of Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa;  
China, UAE;  
France, UK. 
Performance Indicators/ 
Metrics 
Profit USD34m (2016) 
Assets USD14.8bn; Tier 1 Capital USD1.66bn (2016) 
Indicative FDI 
Activities/Footprint 
Branches 
Set up a branch in the UK (1982) 
Established Paris branch of FBN UK (2008); 
Subsidiaries  
Established FBN UK (2002); 
Dem. Rep. of Congo (2011);  
Guinea, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Senegal (2014); 
Representative Offices 
South Africa (2004); 
Beijing, China (2009). 
Accolade (selected) Best Bank brand, 2012-2015  (Banker Magazine)  
 
Source: Case Data 
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Table 10:     Extra-regional FDI Footprints of Nascent African MNEs  
 
MNE Southern’ Economies Advanced Economies 
 
Elsewedy 
(Egypt) 
Czech Republic, Hong Kong, 
India, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Russia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia 
Spain, the Netherlands. 
Orascom 
Construction Ind. 
(Egypt) 
Afghanistan, Brazil, India  Belgium, Cyprus, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, USA 
Office Chérifien des 
Phosphates (OCP) 
(Morocco) 
Argentina, Brazil, India, 
Pakistan, Turkey 
Belgium, USA 
 
Sonatrach (Algeria) Bolivia, Brazil, China, Peru, 
Singapore, Slovenia, South 
Korea, Turkey 
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain, The 
Netherlands, UK, USA 
Sonangol (Angola) Iraq, Cuba, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Singapore;  
Portugal, Switzerland, UK, USA 
Attijariwafa 
(Morocco) 
China 
 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, the Netherlands, UK 
Banque Centrale 
Populaire (Morocco) 
China Belgium, France, Germany, Gilraltar, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Switzerland, UK, USA 
Ecobank (Togo) China, UAE France, UK  
First Bank (Nigeria) China, UAE France, UK 
 
*Case Data 
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BOXES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1 Motivations for nascent African MNEs’ South-South Investments: Market-seeking 
 
 Sonatrach International Holding’s subsidiaries, including SPC Singapore, were reportedly 
set up to market Algerian LPG, crude and other products in the Asia/Pacific market.  
 
 Ecobank’s representative offices in Beijing and Dubai were respectively positioned to 
facilitate the growing trade links between China and Africa, and develop market presence in 
an increasingly important regional hub and emerging financial centre.  
 
 OCP’s JV with Turkish Toros Agri-industry, the Black Sea Fertilizer trading company 
reportedly aimed to extend the company’s market presence to Central Asia and the Balkans;  
 
 First Bank similarly has a subsidiary in the UK, a branch in France and representative 
offices in China.  
 
 OCI’s JV with Brazil’s FITCO International was reportedly aimed at facilitating the trading 
and distribution of OCI Fertilizer Group’s products. OCI’s partnership with Indian 
infrastructure company, HCC Infrastructure Limited, was also focused on pursuing revenue 
generating PPP and Build-Operate-Transfer projects in India.  
 
 Elsewedy’s acquisition of Czech ZPA Smart Energy was reportedly influenced by the type 
of the clients served by the latter, including major power companies, CEZ, PRE, & E. ON 
and CR. Other JVs with Arab Contractors and the Pakistani government in Iraq and Pakistan 
respectively were similarly aimed at accessing market opportunities. 
  
 Sonangol’s Singapore subsidiary, SonAsia, was reportedly set up in 2004 to sell Angola's 
crudes to the Asian continent. 
 
Case Data 
  
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Box 2 Motivations for nascent African MNEs’ South-South Investments: Resource-seeking 
 
 Sonatrach’s exploration and production agreement with Russia’s Gazprom and propane 
hydrogenation JVs in Turkey were reportedly aimed at enhancing its access to critical 
resources and increasing overall production capacity. So was its JV in the upstream Camisea 
gas project in Peru. 
 
 OCP’s JVs in Pakistani and Indian plants that produce phosphate fertilizers and phosphoric 
acid were similarly focused on sustaining its access to critical resources and boosting overall 
capacity.  The same goes for Sonangol’s investments in exploration rights in Iraq and Cuba. 
 
Case Data 
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Box 3 Motivations for nascent African MNEs’ South-North Investments: Strategic assets/ 
            resource-seeking 
 
 Elsewedy’s acquisition of the Spanish wind energy firm, M Torres Olvega, was reportedly aimed 
at leveraging the capabilities of a reputable manufacturer of wind turbines and service for wind 
farms in its subsequent establishment of Sewedy Wind Energy Group (SWEG). Such technology 
leveraging was also observed in Elsewedy’s JV with German steel maker SIAG, which produces 
tube towers, the main component required by Elsewedy for wind turbine installations in its home 
market., and in Sonatrach’s propane de-hydrogenation JV in Northern Spain with BASF of 
Germany. 
 
 OCI’s acquisition, via wholly owned OCI Nitrogen (Netherlands), of an integrated ammonia-
methanol plant in Beaumont, Texas, and of MICRO Chemie B.V., which own major assets in the 
Netherlands (including 30,000-ton ammonia storage tanks, a port terminal and Royal DSM’'s 
Agro and Melamine businesses) were reportedly focused on procuring strategically important 
assets.  
 Sonangol acquisition of America’s Cobalt International Energy’s oil blocks in the U.S. Gulf of 
Mexico, US, in exchange for 40% of two blocks offshore of Angola, was reportedly aimed at 
diversifying Sonangol’s oil and gas supply base. So was OCP’s investments in phosphate 
fertilizers and phosphoric acid production plants in Belgium and France.  
 
Case Data 
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 Box 4  Motivations for nascent African MNEs’ South-North Investments: Market seeking 
 
 Ecobank and First Bank’s subsidiaries in Paris and London were reportedly aimed at developing 
market presence in these key global financial centres. 
 
 BCP’s representative office in Washington was reportedly positioned as a “link between non-
Resident Moroccans and their country of origin as well as to contribute to strengthening business 
relationships between Morocco and the USA”. 
 
 Among Sonatrach International Holding’s many subsidiaries are Sonatrach Petroleum Corporation 
and Sonatrading, both wholly-owned trading units respectively based in London and Amsterdam, 
with responsibility for marketing piped gas and LNG to Europe and America.  
 
 OCI’s acquisition of the Weitz Company, an Iowa-based US general contractor, and long-term off-
take agreement with the Methanex Corporation for output from OCI’s methanol plant in Beaumont, 
Texas are reportedly aimed securing and strengthening access to US market opportunities.   
 
Case Data 
  
 
 Case Data 
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Box 5 Motivations for nascent African MNEs’ South-North Investments:  
            Relationship-seeking 
 
 BCP, First Bank and Attijariwafa’s subsidiaries, branches and representative offices in 
several key financial centres in Europe and North America are reportedly aimed at 
developing and strengthening relationships with companies and individuals who do 
business and maintain links with Africa, including Diaspora or non-resident Africans. 
 
- "What we did is to open branches in front of consulates…so that Moroccans could see 
our branch before they went in” (Attijariwafa CEO) 
 
 Sonatrach’s agreements with the world's largest exporter of natural gas, Russia’s Gazprom 
covering partnerships not only in Europe but in other parts of the world suggest a 
relationship-seeking focus 
 
Case Data 
 
